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GERALD FORD, THE NIXON PARDON, AND THE
RISE OF THE RIGHT
LAURA KALMAN∗
Much recent scholarship about the United States since World War II has focused
on the liberal consensus. Historians have suggested that everyone we wrote about—
from Franklin Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson, Adolf Berle to Abe Fortas, Hugo Black
to Allard Lowenstein—personified the promise and paradoxes of liberalism and
asked when and why that liberal consensus faltered.1 Some contend that liberalism
unraveled at the end of the 1960s because policymakers overpromised in the realm
of social justice and did not deliver, and Vietnam raised questions about the wisdom
of their global vision.2 Others blame Richard Nixon for polarizing the United
States.3 Still others say the racial politics and cleavages we associated with its
backlash predated the 1960s and were rooted in the very rights-consciousness that
was supposedly at the heart of post-World War II liberalism.4
Meanwhile, when conservatives write their history, they argue the tide turned in
their favor in 1964 when Barry Goldwater wrested the Republican nomination from
Nelson Rockefeller. Add to that Nixon’s victories in 1968 and 1972, and Watergate
becomes a bump in the road towards Ronald Reagan’s inevitable 1980 victory.5
Valuable as all these interpretations are, they downplay the survival of liberalism
∗
Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara. B.A., Pomona, 1971;
J.D., UCLA, 1974; PhD, Yale, 1982. For their kindness and conversations during my visit at
Cleveland-Marshall and afterwards, I am indebted to Ben Beckman, Dena Davis, Peter
Garlock, Laura Kolat, Stephen Lazarus, Dean Geoffrey Means, Kunal Parker, Laura Ray, and
James Wilson. I am extremely grateful to all of the editors of the Cleveland State Law
Review.
1
See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN
RECESSION AND WAR (l995); WILLIAM H. CHAFE, NEVER STOP RUNNING: ALLARD LOWENSTEIN
AND THE STRUGGLE TO SAVE AMERICAN LIBERALISM (l993); TONY FREYER, HUGO L. BLACK
AND THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (Oscar Handlin ed., 1990); LAURA KALMAN,
ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (l990); BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND AMERICAN
LIBERALISM: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY WITH DOCUMENTS (1995); JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL:
ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA (1987).
2

See, e.g., ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF
LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., l984).
3

See, e.g., RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING
(2008).

OF AMERICA

4
See THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN
POSTWAR DETROIT (l996).
5

See, e.g., WILLIAM A. RUSHER, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT 161 (1984); LEE EDWARDS, THE
CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION: THE MOVEMENT THAT REMADE AMERICA 141 (1999). Steven F.
Hayward provides a fascinating account of the history of both liberalism and conservatism
together from the conservative perspective in THE AGE OF REAGAN: THE FALL OF THE OLD
LIBERAL ORDER, 1964-1980 (2001).
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past the 1960s and ignore the extent to which liberalism and conservatism have
coexisted in modern America.
Perhaps more than the 1960s, the early 1970s marked the high water mark of the
liberal consensus.6 Roe v. Wade, which grounded the right to abortion in the right to
privacy, represented the apex of rights-based liberalism and perpetuated the division
between public and private, a crucial facet to liberalism.7 As President, Nixon often
governed liberally even though he talked conservatively, and thus many
conservatives regarded him as a traitor.8 The rise of the modern Republican Party
and the right was highly contingent: When Nixon resigned, both the Republican
Party and conservatives seemed even more divided, endangered, and mired in
scandal than they did after the 2008 election of President Barack Obama.9 In this
Article, I discuss a critical time for those forces and the rule of law, the first month
of the Ford Presidency.
In 1974, it seemed as if everyone wanted to go to law school. Over 135,000
LSATs had been administered in 1973-74, almost double compared to any year
during the 1960s.10 Yet, so many of those involved in the Watergate cover-up were
lawyers that Time magazine claimed “there ha[d] been no comparable conspiracy of
lawyers in [all] history.”11
In the White House, in August 1974, one lawyer prepared to resign the
Presidency to avoid impeachment and another prepared to assume it. The
6

BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, THE SEVENTIES: THE GREAT SHIFT IN AMERICAN CULTURE,
SOCIETY, AND POLITICS 9, 20 (2002).
7

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

8

William Rusher, Statement of Howard Phillips, Conservatives Should Help Remove
Nixon, July 30, 1974 (Box 71, Folder: 9, William Rusher Papers, Library of Congress). David
Greenberg provides an excellent history of historians’ depictions of Nixon as liberal in
Richard the Bleeding Hearted, 30 REVS. IN AM. HIST. 156 (2002).
9
Once again, it has become fashionable to proclaim the Republican Party an
“Endangered Species.” See, e.g., TIME, May 18, 2009, cover. As Republicans and
conservatives seek to rebuild their party and movement in the wake of Barack Obama’s 2008
election as President, they harken back to a similar journey out of the wilderness in the 1970s.
“Think the Republican Party is in bad shape today?,” one conservative asked recently, “[y]ou
should have seen it then. In the wake of stagflation, Watergate, and America’s first lost war—
all either starting or ending in ignominy in the Nixon-Ford years—early GOP recovery was
far from a betting favorite.” Jeffrey Bell, Jeffrey Bell: Kemp Brought America Back from
1970s,
NEWSMAX,
May
3,
2009,
http://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/jack_kemp_jeffrey_bell/2009/05/03/210151.html?s=al&
promo_code=7F0D-1. Richard Viguerie, for example, exhorted conservatives to oppose the
nomination of Justice Souter’s replacement by reminding them that even if they lose, the
confirmation battle can do for them what the Panama Canal treaty fight did for them in the
1970s. Talk of the Nation: Conservatives Take on Potential SCOTUS Nominees (NPR radio
broadcast May 20, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104349694.
10

Jordan A. Miller, “Why Is Everyone Taking the LSAT?”: A Model of the Demand for
Law School 53 fig.1 (May 2004) (unpublished thesis, Stanford University),
http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Theses/Theses_2004/Miller.pdf.
11

José M. Ferrer III, An Awful Lot of Lawyers Involved, TIME, July 9, l973,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,907523,00.html.
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resemblance ended there. Brilliant, cunning, secretive, and insecure Nixon divided
the world into friends and enemies. In contrast, Ford thrived on camaraderie,
conciliation and compromise.12 By the time Ford was in the seventh grade, he had
developed his philosophy of life: “Everyone, I decided, had more good qualities than
bad. If I understood and tried to accentuate those good qualities in others, I could
get along much better.”13
Ford’s sunny outlook fueled his rise in Congress. When Spiro Agnew resigned
the Vice-Presidency in disgrace, Nixon reluctantly tapped Ford as the only
Republican acceptable to the Democratic Congress.14 The most damning complaint
in Ford’s FBI file was that he once tackled someone in a football game after the
whistle that signaled the end of play blew.15 Ford was decent and engagingly
humble: he said he was “a Ford, not a Lincoln.”16
Ford’s modesty seemed fitting. He had graduated in the top quarter of his class
from University of Michigan, where he was also a football star and in the top quarter
of his class at Yale Law School.17 Nonetheless, he seemed neither articulate nor
bright.18 As Lyndon Johnson famously remarked, “Ford’s the only man I ever knew
who can’t chew gum and fart at the same time.”19 Ford often misspoke, as when he
toasted President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and “the great people of the government of
Israel” Sadat led.20 Senate Majority Leader Michael Mansfield said that Ford has
“had a remarkable career because he has been so unremarkable himself.”21
Yet, as Ford became President on August 9, 1974, his ordinariness and
“accentuate the positive” philosophy was welcome.22 Presidents since Theodore
Roosevelt had so increased the power of the office that it had been commonplace to
speak of an “imperial Presidency.”23 Ford, with his modest virtues, seemed
incapable of doing anything but cutting down the Presidency to the right size.24
12
Gerald Ford: American Presidents Exclusive Gerald Ford Biography,
http://www.american-presidents.com/gerald-ford [hereinafter “Exclusive Biography”].
13

GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GERALD R. FORD 46 (l979).

14

Richard A. Ryan, 38th President from Grand Rapids restored honor to White House,
DET. NEWS, Dec. 27, 2006, http://detnews.com/article/20061227/NATION/612270413.
15

ROBERT T. HARTMANN, PALACE POLITICS: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF THE FORD YEARS 73
n.* (1980).
16

FORD, supra note 13, at 112.

17

Id. at 53, 56.

18

Exclusive Biography, supra note 12.

19

HARTMANN, supra note 15, at 30.

20

Id. at 279.

21

‘The Fords from Grand Rapids,’ 219 THE NATION, Aug. 31, 1974, at 132.

22

Exclusive Biography, supra note 12.

23

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1 (1973).

24

Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83
MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (1999).
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Ford struck just the right note in his inaugural address.25 Watergate actually
raised a number of constitutional questions that Nixon’s resignation left
unanswered.26 But, when Ford said the lesson of Watergate was that “our
Constitution works” and that “our great Republic is a Government of laws and not of
men,” he voiced a misperception at once widely shared and deeply comforting.27
Acknowledging the “internal wounds of Watergate” were “more painful and . . .
poisonous than those of foreign wars,” Ford pleaded to “let brotherly love purge our
hearts of suspicion and of hate.”28 In all, he mentioned love three times, God four.29
Ford’s best line that confronted Watergate and promised to end the era: “My fellow
Americans, our long national nightmare is over.”30
After Ford's acclaimed speech, Americans could indeed contemplate the end to
their Watergate nightmare and the beginning of healing. In part, it was relative.
Anyone seemed better than Nixon.31 But, Ford really did seem to represent a
substantive improvement, particularly in his use of symbols to remind Americans
that he was Everyman.32
Nixon never wanted Americans to see him as one of them. So uncomfortable did
Nixon become at state dinners that he reduced them to fifty-eight minutes. As part
of this effort, he banished the soup course, announcing that “men don't really like
soup.”33 Ford, however, was easy and hospitable.34 He substituted the “Michigan
Fight Song” for “Hail to the Chief.”35 Nixon invited Democrats and reporters that he
had labeled “enemies” to his first state dinner.36 The public and reporters went wild
when they learned Ford was toasting his own English muffins.37 A New Yorker

25

President Gerald R. Ford, Remarks on Taking the Oath of Office as President (Aug. 9,
1974), http://www.ford.utexas.edu/LIBRARY/speeches/740001.htm [hereinafter “Ford,
Remarks”].
26
See, e.g., Rozell, supra note 24; Frank O. Bowman, III & Stephen L. Sepinuck, “High
Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Defining the Constitutional Limits on Presidential
Impeachment, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1517 (1999).
27

Ford, Remarks, supra note 25.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

James Cannon, Gerald R. Ford, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/character/essays/ford.

html.
32

Ford, Remarks, supra note 25.

33

H.R. HALDEMAN, THE ENDS OF POWER 110 (l978).

34

FORD, supra note 13, at 156.

35

Id. at 126.

36

Id. at 140-41.

37

Iconic Photos, Gerald Ford and his Toaster,
http://iconicphotos.wordpress.com/2009/06/16/gerald-ford-and-his-toaster/.
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cartoon featured a sleepy wife reminding her irate husband that “[t]he President of
the United States of America makes his own breakfast.”38
Ford even seemed ready to rise above his own conservatism. He told liberals to
“forget” his voting record, which reflected the need to satisfy Michigan
constituents.39 The secretary to the Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus
was so surprised to hear the President was on the phone that she thought it was a
practical joke. 40 But, it was Ford on the phone, inviting caucus members by the
White House for a chat, an invitation he repeated to Bella Abzug and feminists to
whom he promised to fight for the Equal Rights Amendment.41
During Ford’s second week as President, he took action by highlighting his
desire for national reconciliation and testified to the power liberal rhetoric retained in
Washington. Key Congressional Republicans urged him to sound liberal, “to
continue the healing,” to avoid divisive issues like busing.42 They reminded him that
“the President must represent all the people, including the poor and black . . .
deserters and draft dodgers.”43
Nixon’s determination to protect his Vietnam policy had followed him down the
road to Watergate,44 and he had stressed the need to punish war resisters.45 In his
first show of leadership, Ford decided on a different approach.46 He would make his
position public, he resolved, not before a welcoming liberal audience, but a resistant
conservative one.47 Standing before thousands of stunned veterans of foreign wars,
Ford reminded them that he had spoken of justice and mercy in his inaugural address
and threw “the weight of my Presidency . . . on the side of leniency” and conditional
amnesty.48

38

Editorial Cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, l974, at 32.

39

Robert Sherrill, What Grand Rapids Did for Jerry Ford—Vice and Versa, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, l974, at 31, 86. According to the liberal Americans for Democratic Action, he had
voted the ADA's way just four times between 1970 and 1973. Stina Santiestevan, Gerald
Ford: The Man, The Record, The Prospect, ADA WORLD, Aug./Sept. 1974, at 3.
40

RICHARD REEVES, A FORD, NOT A LINCOLN 68 (l975).

41

Eileen Shanahan, Ford Again Backs Rights Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1974, at 34.

42

William E. Timmons, Mem. for Robert Hartmann, Aug. 9, l974 (Box 13, File: Aug. 914, l974, William E. Timmons Files, Ford Library) (reporting on House Minority Leader John
Rhodes and Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott).
43
Id.; see also William E. Timmons, Mem. for the President, Aug. 14, l974, (Box 13, File:
Aug. 9-14, l974, William E. Timmons Files, Ford Library) (reporting Hugh Scott's views on
amnesty).
44

See STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE : THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD
NIXON 108 (1990).
45

Richard Nixon, News Conference (Jan. 31, 1973), http:/www.americanpresidency.org.

46

DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, GERALD R. FORD 67 (2007).

47

A Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1974, at 34.

48

Gerald Ford, Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Annual Convention (Aug. 19,
1974), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4476&st=&st1; Geoff Shepard,
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Next, Ford named his Vice President. Most Republicans listed Republican
National Committee Chair George Bush as their first choice, and Bush wanted the
job.49 But, some on Ford’s staff thought his selection would seem “weak and
depressingly conventional [partisan] act.”50 So, Ford chose Governor Rockefeller of
New York, conservative Republicans’ anti-Christ.51
Since Franklin Roosevelt relieved Herbert Hoover, the national mood did not so
quickly change. Democrats and many Republicans fell over themselves to say Ford
had replaced “[the] national frown with a national smile.”52 According to the
Washington Post, Ford was “the most normal, sane, down-to-earth individual to
work in the Oval Office since Harry Truman left.”53 (Truman, who had been reviled
when he departed from Washington, became a popular hero to Democrats and

Mem. for Gen. Haig, Aug. 21, l974 (Box 1, File: Kenneth Cole, Aug. 8-25, 1974, Alexander
Haig Files, Ford Library) (reporting on reaction to speech).
49

TOM WICKER, GEORGE HERBERT WALKER BUSH 36 (2004).

50

JAMES CANNON, TIME AND CHANCE: GERALD FORD’S APPOINTMENT WITH HISTORY 42325 (1994).
51

Rockefeller had been anathema to Republicans on the right at least since 1964, when he
unsuccessfully challenged Goldwater for the Republican nomination and portrayed Goldwater
as the captive of the far rightwing. ROBERT ALAN GOLDBERG, BARRY GOLDWATER 172-73
(1995). Ironically, liberals had no use for a Rockefeller Vice Presidency, either. The ADA
objected to Rockefeller’s gifts to politicians, such as Henry Kissinger; his response to the
1971 Attica prison uprising, his social service and drug use policies, his hawkishness on
national defense, and maintained that the Rockefeller family’s wealth would create conflicts
of interest for him. Americans for Democratic Action, Board Meeting of September 14-16,
1974 (Box 1, Folder: November 22-24, 1974, M 2001-087, State Historical Society of
Wisconsin); President Rockefeller, ADA WORLD, Oct. 1974, at 5.
52
Ford described this as his objective in A Time to Heal, supra note 13, at 127. From the
Democratic side of the aisle, Senator Mansfield declared: “The sun is shining again.” For an
equally enthusiastic Republican perspective, see Robert Griffin, The Man Who Happened to
Become President, in THE FORD PRESIDENCY: TWENTY-TWO INTIMATE PERSPECTIVES OF
GERALD R. FORD 15 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., l988). Hugh Sidey gushed: “For ten years
this nation has suffered from cardiac insufficiency. Now the heart is beginning to pump again
under Jerry Ford. . . . The adjectives for all this have been extravagant: new wine, fresh
breeze, clean broom. They are an accurate White House measure.” Hugh Sidey, So Like the
Rest of America, TIME, Sept. 2, l974. The New Republic compared the nation to a child who
had “swallowed something nasty and thrown up and feels better. Mr. Ford is everything that
Nixon wasn’t, with warmth and openness and decency, and he has engendered nationwide
affection.” TRB, Postmortem, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, l974. Ford’s adviser, Robert
Hartmann, said that “no American President, possibly excepting General Washington, ever
entered upon his official duties with a greater reservoir of public good will or with higher
hopes for his success.” HARTMANN, supra note 15, at 164. But cf. EDWARD BERKOWITZ,
SOMETHING HAPPENED: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL OVERVIEW OF THE SEVENTIES 74 (2006)
(suggesting that “Ford’s honeymoon with Congress and the press” was “never too passionate
to begin with”).
53
David Broder, Giving Mr. Ford a Chance, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1974, at A16; see also
MARK J. ROZELL, THE PRESS AND THE FORD PRESIDENCY 43 n.60 (1992).
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Republicans at just this moment).54 Americans rooted for Ford.55 “I do not want a
good honeymoon,” he told Congress, but “a good marriage.”56 The honeymoon,
however, was great.57 Though every President gets one, there was something special
about Ford’s honeymoon. People wanted desperately to believe that someone could
heal the wounds of Watergate and Vietnam.58
In these first happy days of the Ford Administration, the fiercest hostility toward
the new President seemed to lie inside the White House. Criminal charges related to
Watergate had already dispatched many, but about four-hundred-and-eighty Nixon
men remained.59 Ford’s transition team, headed by Donald Rumsfeld, wanted him to
clean house.60 But, the President desired continuity and disapproved of a “purge.”61
He begged everyone, especially Nixon’s last Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig, to stay
on the job.62 A skilled infighter and Nixon loyalist, Haig frustrated Ford’s every
effort to step out of Nixon’s shadow.63
As Ford assumed the Presidency, he faced two troubling questions about his
predecessor that Haig and other holdovers sought to influence. What should Ford do
about the former President and his records—the forty-six million pages of paper and
the nine-hundred and fifty reels of tape on which Nixon had recorded his
conversations? Named an unindicted co-conspirator by the Watergate grand jury,
Nixon had been subpoenaed to appear as a witness in the upcoming trials of his
Administration officials and feared he himself might yet be indicted for obstruction
of justice.64 As Nixon prepared his testimony (and looked ahead to paying his
lawyers by writing his memoirs), he “desperately” wanted access to the tapes.65

54

See MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF VA., Impact and Legacy, in ESSAYS ON
HARRY S. TRUMAN AND HIS ADMINISTRATION,
http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/truman (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
55
See Mark Feeney, Gerald Ford Dies at 93: An Unelected President, He Helped Salve a
Wounded Nation, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 27, 2006, at A1.
56

Address to a Joint Session of the Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 7 (Aug. 12, 1974).

57

See Feeney, supra note 55.

58

See Linda Wertheimer, Special Report: Former President Gerald Ford Dies; Sought to
Heal Nation Disillusioned by Watergate Scandal, NPR, Dec. 27, 2006,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story.php?storyId=6685816.
59

Id.

60

FORD, supra note 13, at 148.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 147.

63

See, e.g., HARTMANN, supra note 15, at 180, 232 (discussing Haig’s frustration of
Ford’s attempt to take down portraits of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, which
Nixon had ordered hung alongside that of Dwight Eisenhower in the White House Cabinet,
and to replace them with those of Harry Truman and Abraham Lincoln).
64

FORD, supra note 13, at 164.

65

Id.
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The White House wanted to be unaffiliated with the Watergate scandal. “Get
Nixon materials out of White House as soon as possible,” Rumsfeld advised.66
“Quite apart from any illegal . . . dealings” revealed on the tapes, attorney Philip
Areeda counseled, the “hair-down” discussions of politics there could “demean and
embarrass the participants, the Republican Party, the Presidency, and . . .
government generally.”67 Past Presidents had treated their records as their private
property.68 Yet the tapes contained evidence courts might need and that Nixon
might destroy.69 Nevertheless, White House Counsel Fred Buzhardt ruled that the
tapes were Nixon’s personal property.70 Buzhardt then shaded the truth, leading
Ford’s press secretary to believe he acted with Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski’s
approval.71 The press secretary’s announcement that the Special Prosecutor had
approved the decision to give Nixon the tapes created the impression the Ford
Administration was working overtime to help Nixon and forced Buzhardt’s
resignation.72
When it came to trying to persuade Ford to end his predecessor’s ordeal, Haig
and other Nixon loyalists proved to be equally zealous. During Ford’s Vice
President confirmation hearings, the committee asked him whether a President
would have the power to prevent the criminal investigation and prosecution of
Nixon. Ford had responded: “I do not think the public would stand for it.”73 As the
New York Times astutely observed, Ford’s answer did not preclude a pardon.74
According to Ford, Haig first pointedly informed him “that a President does have
authority to grant a pardon even before criminal action has been taken against an
individual” in a conversation on the morning of August 1, eight days before he
became President.75 When Ford recounted the conversation to aides, they told him
the obvious: Haig might have proposed a deal by which Nixon would surrender the
Presidency in exchange for Ford’s promise to pardon him, and Ford’s silence
implied consent.76 Ford telephoned Haig in the presence of witnesses to say he

66
Handwritten Note: “Don R.,” Aug. l974 (Box 30, File: 1974-1977, Philip Buchen Files,
Ford Library).
67

Philip Areeda, Mem. for the President, Dec. 2, 1974 (Box 24, File: 1974-1977, John
Marsh Files, Ford Library).
68

FORD, supra note 13, at 164.

69

See id. at 157.

70

See BARRY WERTH, 31 DAYS: GERALD FORD, THE NIXON PARDON AND A GOVERNMENT
72 (2006).

IN CRISIS
71

Id. at 73.

72

Id. at 71-80.

73

Clifton Daniel, Presidential Clemency: Ford Says He Will Decide Nixon Case After
Legal Process Runs Its Course, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, l974, at 21.
74

Id.

75

FORD, supra note 13, at 4.

76

Id.
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could make no commitments, and he had made none the previous morning.77 He did
not expressly rule out a pardon (and he did not allude to a late night 1:00 a.m.
telephone conversation he had with Haig the previous evening).78
The pressure from Nixon’s men continued after Ford became President with a
drumbeat of warnings that Nixon suffered from potentially life-threatening phlebitis
and was depressed, even manic.79 Henry Kissinger told Ford that an indictment or a
trial would have “grave physical and psychological repercussions” on Nixon and
damage American credibility abroad.80 On August 27, 1974, Nixon loyalist Leonard
Garment spoke with several journalists who despised Nixon, but now favored an
early pardon.81 Garment then called on Abe Fortas, who had been a Supreme Court
Justice until forced to resign from the bench because of one of Nixon’s Presidential
“dirty tricks.”82 Should Nixon receive a pardon, Garment asked.83 It was
“‘Ecclesiastes time,’” Fortas answered, “a time for . . . reconciliation, and not ‘the
horror’ of a long state trial of the former President.”84 Perhaps others would also
prove forgiving, Garment reasoned.85
At Haig’s urging, Garment now drafted a memorandum for Haig and for
Buzhardt’s successor as White House Counsel and Ford’s former law partner, Philip
Buchen.86 A quick pardon would be greeted by “a national sigh of relief” and would
exorcise Nixon’s ghost, freeing Ford to get on with governing.”87 At l0:30 a.m.,
after meeting with Ford to make the argument, Haig telephoned Garment to say, “It’s
all set.”88
Wishful thinking as yet, but the matter was closer to resolution after Ford’s first
press conference four hours later. Ford had prepared for it as if for doctoral orals,
undergoing mock questions on issues ranging from the economy to the Soviets.89
But, from the initial inquiry—did he believe Nixon should have immunity from

77

WERTH, supra note 70, at 204-05.

78

Id.

79

John Herbers, Ford Aides Silent on Link of Pardon and Nixon Health, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14, 1974, at 61 (reporting that Nixon’s son-in-law, David Eisenhower, had told Ford that
Nixon was alternately despairing and euphoric).
80

HENRY KISSINGER, YEARS OF RENEWAL 39 (l999).

81

Leonard Garment, Annals of Law: The Hill Case, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 17, 1989, at
90, 107 [hereinafter “Garment, Annals”].
82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id. at 108.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

FORD, supra note 13, at 157.
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prosecution?—the media was interested in only Nixon’s fate.90 And as Ford
subsequently realized, his answers seemed contradictory, sometimes suggesting that
Nixon should receive immunity soon; at others, that he would let the legal process
run its course.91
After the press conference, Ford told Buchen to research the President’s pardon
power: “Did [he] have the legal right to pardon someone who had not been indicted,
or convicted, yet?”92 Buchen worked in secret and recalled feeling “scared” to “even
to get a book out of the library [with] a ‘P’ on the front of it.”93 Even so, he easily
found “enough law” to support a broad constitutional pardon power.94 The President
could issue a pardon before indictment, and acceptance constituted an admission of
guilt.95 The prospect of a pardon might solve another problem too, by encouraging
Nixon to make a satisfactory disposition of those pesky records. If Ford intervened,
Buchen said that he should do so soon.96
A week after the press conference, Special Prosecutor Jaworski also made it clear
to Buchen that he did not want to indict Nixon if the President planned to pardon
him.97 The publicity around Watergate, Jaworski told Ford, ensured that at least nine
months must elapse after indictment before jury selection.98
In response, Ford decided that a properly negotiated pardon would bring his
Administration out of Watergate’s shadow. On the other hand, an indictment,
followed by a trial, would not. The decision was simple. He confronted pressing
domestic and foreign policy issues. He did not want to be distracted by “lawyers’
endless arguments” about the tapes and records and journalists’ incessant questions
about Nixon’s legal status.99 Ford said that Yale Law School taught him to see law
as a tool of public policy, and while he “respected the tenet that no man should be
above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixon—and Watergate—behind us
as quickly as possible.”100 Ford’s determination also reflected his long relationship

90
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with his predecessor and his compassion for Nixon’s family.101 “I looked upon him
as my personal friend,” Ford acknowledged, “[a]nd I had no hesitancy about
granting the pardon, because I felt that we had this relationship.”102 Primarily,
though, one adviser realized, the pardon was “a selfish act” to enable him “to get on
with the business of the Ford presidency.”103 He was enjoying his work too much to
share it with Nixon’s ghost, faced pressing issues of the economy and foreign policy,
and “had to get the monkey off my back.”104
Having reached a decision that seemed reasonable enough from Ford’s
perspective, he then made several mistakes. First, he refused to demand an
agreement with respect to the papers and tapes from Nixon that Congress would
accept. Oddly, the President chose Benton Becker, an attorney under investigation
for criminal misconduct, as his envoy to draft an agreement on the records for
announcement with the pardon.105 Nixon’s representatives gave little to Becker
during the negotiations; perhaps Haig tipped them off that Ford was not conditioning
the pardon, as Buchen had recommended.106 Nixon pledged to deposit his papers
and tapes in the National Archives.107 But, he retained exclusive power over access
to them, the right to withdraw papers after three years had elapsed, and the guarantee
that the tapes would be destroyed at his death or in a decade, whichever came first.108
Nor did Ford demand an admission of guilt and repentance from Nixon. Legally,
acceptance of the pardon was an admission of guilt. For years after, Ford carried in
his wallet an excerpt from the Supreme Court’s decision in Burdick v. United
States,109 declaring that a pardon “carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a
confession of it.”110 But, Becker and others also let Nixon know that the President
“welcome[d] a statement of contrition.”111 Ford blamed Haig when he did not get
one, concluding that Haig let Nixon know “he didn’t have to make an outright
101
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admission of guilt.”112 Predictably, Nixon acknowledged only having made
“mistakes over Watergate,” a declaration so ambiguous it was counterproductive.113
Finally, Ford made the decision as if he were still in Congress, where, in those
days, the heat disappeared when the battle ended.114 Yet he also refused to lay the
groundwork for the pardon by engaging in substantive discussions about it with key
members of Congress and the Attorney General, who could have helped him justify
it.115
The “full, free and absolute pardon” that the President announced upon his return
from church on Sunday, September 8, 1974,116 the same day daredevil biker Evel
Knievel unsuccessfully attempted to rocket across Snake River, resulted in a public
relations disaster.117 Evel Knievel received millions for the stunt, but there was no
silver lining for Ford.118 It brought his honeymoon to a halt and left disillusionment
and cynicism in its wake.119 Two weeks after the President announced the pardon,
the media reported: “Outside the White House, some 250 pickets from George
Washington University lofted a bed sheet with the words ‘PROMISE ME PARDON
AND I’LL MAKE YOU PRESIDENT.’”120
To be sure, the next generation would vindicate Ford. (It is still too soon to say
whether “history” has). When he received the “Profile in Courage” award from the
Kennedy Library in 2001, the citation dwelled at length on his decision to pardon
Nixon.121 At Ford’s death, Newsweek insisted that the pardon “spared the nation an
ordeal of recrimination and allowed the healing to begin.”122 But, I challenge the
current conventional wisdom that the pardon was a good idea. I think that the
pardon contributed to cynicism about government; and, furthermore, it was the worst
political blunder between Dean Acheson’s statement regarding South Korea being
112
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113
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outside the American defense perimeter and Bill Clinton’s refusal to settle the Paula
Jones case, which led to his impeachment.
Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s decision to pardon him were both controversial,
and the pardon provoked a more negative reaction. For one reason or another,
Nixon’s decision to quit pleased two-thirds of those polled.123 Yet, to Ford’s
“immense shock,”124 almost the same percentage thought the pardon wrong.125
Researchers later found that “Ford's pardon of Nixon was more highly correlated
with the drop in political trust than were any of the previous events of Watergate.”126
Reporters were even angrier than the public. In part, the pardon was their
fault.127 The President would have thought he could “get away with it,” one
admitted, because they had presented him as “irresistible.”128 Livid journalists “just
turned a full 180 degrees and began to pound Ford and his lousy English muffins.”129
They had transformed him from frog into Prince Charming just one month earlier
and now they made him a frog all over again.
Ford was worse off because suspicions he had made a deal with Haig raised
questions about his integrity and decency. Those suspicions were apparently
groundless. Ford’s conversations with Haig and Nixon probably led them to guess a
pardon was forthcoming.130 But, no one has ever found evidence of a deal.131
Even without a deal, though, the announcement of the pardon remained
problematic. Ford rationalized the pardon poorly, claiming it would heal the wounds
of Watergate and that protracted litigation would stir “ugly passions.”132 Other
trials—think those of Sacco and Vanzetti, Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs, for
example—had stirred ugly passions.133 No one called off them.134
And if Ford “[a]bove all . . . wanted it understood that my fundamental decision
to grant a pardon had nothing to do with any sympathy I might feel for Nixon
personally or any concern I might have for the state of his health,” as he insisted at
the time, he was not thinking clearly.135 Moreover, if Ford wanted to defend the
123
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pardon primarily by stressing the need “to heal the wounds throughout the United
States,”136 as he insisted publicly at the time, he should have toned down the portion
of his statement declaring that “serious allegations and accusations hang like a sword
over our former President’s head, threatening his health as he tries to reshape his
life.”137 This is especially true because journalists knew Nixon was playing golf and
had seen him walking along the ocean in front of the California beachfront mansion
to which he had been “exiled.”138 Additionally, Ford should not have insisted that,
“Richard Nixon and his loved ones have suffered enough.”139
Further, Ford’s timing was poor, guaranteeing that the pardon would become an
issue in the upcoming Congressional elections. Why not wait until afterwards,
especially when he could calm his predecessor with a telephone call saying a pardon
was forthcoming?140 More importantly, by acting when he did, Ford had “created
the impression that he would have pardoned Nixon no matter what criminal charges
might have been lodged against him or what evidence might have been presented to
support them. In effect, the President said that no crimes that Nixon might have
committed would [have] preclud[ed] a pardon.”141 According to Senator Walter
Mondale, a liberal Democrat, “no one wished the former President to go to jail, but
to grant a pardon for unspecified crimes and acts is unprecedented in American
history.”142 Presidential pardons typically specified the acts the accused had
committed.143 Even though many did not want to see the former President sent to
the country club prisons, to which so many of Nixon’s colleagues would be
consigned, most sought a full accounting of the crimes he had allegedly
committed.144
An indictment would have allowed the facts and allegations to come out first.
True, Jaworski feared that indictment, followed by a pardon, would undermine the
rule of law.145 But Jaworski also knew the grand jury would indict Nixon “in a
minute.”146 Most of Jaworski’s staff “wanted to indict and signal President Ford that
136
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a pardon was in order . . . if Nixon would admit his guilt,” a recommendation
Jaworski admitted “had some merit.”147
And though evidence of rehabilitation almost always accompanied a pardon, in
this instance there was none.148 One clergyman aptly described the tone of Nixon’s
statement acknowledging the pardon: “Get this behind me so that I can get on with
writing my memoirs and tell that I was right in the first place.”149 Ford should have
required his predecessor to display repentance.
Now Ford had placed himself in an untenable position. On the one hand, he had
damaged the principle of equal justice under law. How could the trials of the
Watergate minnows proceed when the whale swam free? On the other, how could
he free all the fish?150 When a Presidential spokesman suggested on September 10,
1974, that pardons were “under study” for all former and prospective Watergate
defendants, the ensuing uproar forced the White House to issue an immediate
retraction.151
And no matter how the public felt about the pardon, few praised the agreement
allowing Nixon to control his records. For example, when Buchen replied to a
reporter’s question about “the right of history,” by saying that “the historians will
protest, but I think historians cannot complain if evidence for history is not
perpetuated which shouldn’t have been created in the first place,” he seemed to have
taken leave of his senses.152 Historians were not the only ones who wanted to know
whether Nixon had committed criminal acts. Congress promptly abrogated the
agreement by enacting the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservations Act,
requiring delivery of the tapes to the complete “possession and control” of the
Archivist of the United States and ordering the Archivist to give highest priority to
processing those portions of the tapes and other records that would “provide the
public with the full truth . . . of the abuses of governmental power popularly
identified [as] ‘Watergate.’”153 (Nixon then sued to recover possession of the tapes,
and the ensuing litigation tied up the release of most tapes for over two decades.)154
Congress also asserted itself by creating a committee that directed the President
to explain the pardon. Prior Presidents had routinely declined to testify before a
Congressional committee, but by October 1974, Ford was so frantic to defend the
147
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pardon he agreed to appear.155 Representative Elizabeth Holtzman fired seven
questions at Ford. How could the President explain his failure to specify the crimes
for which Nixon was pardoned, his refusal to require “any acknowledgement of
guilt” from Nixon, his lack of consultation with the Attorney General, the
“extraordinary haste in which the pardon was decided on and the secrecy with which
it was carried out,” the accompanying agreement on the tapes, his choice of Becker
as an envoy, and his failure to discuss the tapes agreement with Jaworski?156
Returning to the theme of a deal, Holtzman referred to “suspicions . . . that the
reasons for the pardon and the simultaneous tape agreement was to insure that the
tape recordings between yourself and Richard Nixon never came out in public.”157
The “most damaging aspects” of Ford's appearance, one aide reflected afterwards,
“were the unanswered questions posed by Ms. Holtzman and the likely adverse
public reaction to them.”158
Amid all of the controversy over the pardon in 1974, the metaphor of Watergate
as a national wound became stronger. Ford reasoned that “[y]ou can't pull a bandage
off slowly,” but even he began to wonder whether he had just rubbed salt in it.159
On November 5, 1974, the Democrats won forty seats in the House, giving them
the two-thirds majority required to override Presidential vetoes; came just four votes
shy of a two-thirds majority in the Senate; and swept the statehouses.160. Democrats
won even in twenty-one traditionally Republican suburban districts.161 The
Republicans now held only thirteen governorships and four state legislatures. Only
thirty-eight percent of eligible voters cast a ballot. Voters overwhelmingly marked
their ballots for liberal and left-liberal Democrats who inveighed against Watergate
and the pardon, along with the economy.162 Indeed, many believed that, despite
Nixon’s victories in ’64 and ’72, the 1974 election returns represented “a great party
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landslide” for the Democrats.163 Across the spectrum of the Republican Party, there
was despair.164
The national conservative weekly, Human Events, had been grimly charting
Ford’s move left all fall.165 Though the “[o]utrage [o]ver [p]ardon [s]hows [l]iberals
[c]annot [b]e [a]ppeased,” it said, Ford didn’t seem to get it.166 Instead of arguing
for a strong defense, he had “virtually promis[ed] conditional amnesty for deserters
and draft dodgers!”167 He had “woo[ed] women’s libbers—endorsing the so-called
Equal Rights Amendment and posing with an arm around far-out liberal Rep. Bella
Abzug.”168 He had left the Black Caucus “all smiles.”169 The Rockefeller
nomination was “most galling.”170 Human Events characterized the future of
American conservatism as “extremely precarious.”171
As the Republicans’ fortunes plummeted after Watergate, some Republicans
thought their party should go the way of the Whigs. One conservative went to
Ronald Reagan and asked him to lead the new party.172 The Republican Presidential
nomination in 1976, even if attainable, would require compromise with GOP powerbrokers and prove “worthless” because there were so few Republicans, he warned.173
Reagan seemed intrigued. He mused to the media, “I see the statements of
disaffection of people in both parties,” and wondered, “[d]o you restore the
confidence or do you change the name . . . ?”174 His backers reined him in, and the
day after the 1974 midterm elections Reagan denied that the GOP was dead.175 He
maintained that “the Republican Party represents basically the thinking of the people

163
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of this country, if we can get that message across to the people. I’m going to try to
do that.”176
That was an announcement that should have created consternation in the Ford
White House, particularly since Reagan constantly badmouthed Ford.177 But Ford,
Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney refused to take Reagan seriously despite
warnings from staffers of future “severe rightwing problems.”178
And so, Ford did not worry about conservative Republicans after the midterm
elections. The activities of what would be called the “New Right,”179 which had
come into existence when Ford nominated Rockefeller and would take credit for
Reagan’s 1980 election, remained below the White House radar screen.180 The New
Right would not score its first legislative victory until the end of 1975 and would not
find “the big issue” it searched for when it seized on the Panama Canal treaties in
1977.181 The media ignored all conservative Republicans except for Reagan, whom
it treated as a dimwit.182
Consequently, one conservative historian said that the Republican Party in 1974
seemed to be “sinking into oblivion.”183 In 1974, many of the politically powerful
still spoke the language of liberalism and left-liberalism, and conservatism was in
disarray. It was between 1975 and 1979 that two-failed presidencies, the growth of
neo-conservatism, the “New Right,” the religious right, anticommunism, and supplyside economics laid the groundwork for the transformation of the United States.
Those who contended later that the tide had turned right in the sixties and that
Watergate was a bump in the road towards Reagan’s inevitable victory in 1980
rewrote the past.184 The story of the growing power and appeal of conservatism and
the Republican Party was more interesting than that. It was a story of the seventies.
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